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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
on May 12, 1989•

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment

or For Relief From the Judgment which was denied on August 31,
1989.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal

pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in only awarding

plaintiff alimony in the sum of $1,800.00 per month in light of
the disparity between the parties1 incomes, the length of the
marriage, and the defendants needs and lack of specified job
training or skills.
2.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in basing the

award of alimony to the defendant using the current income of the
plaintiff at the time of trial to establish his ability to pay
alimony while at the same time basing the parties1 standard of
living on the reduced income earned by the plaintiff during the
years 1981 through 1986.
3.

Whether the Court abused its discretion by failing to

consider, as an expense of sale, the capital gains tax
consequences to be assessed against each party on the sale of the
California home prior to equal distribution of the equity
therein.
4.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in awarding an

equal division of the net equity from the California home in

light of the parties disparate ability to pay capital gains
taxes.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1989).
Disposition of property —

Maintenance of health care

of parties and children —

court to have continuing

jurisdiction —

custody and visitation —

termination of

alimony -- non-meritorious petition for modification.
(1)

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may

include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
property, and parties.
. . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Walter James Howell, the Plaintiff-Respondent in this
case, filed a complaint against his wife, the DefendantAppellant.

Mrs. Barbara Joyce Howell filed a counterclaim,

seeking a decree of divorce, alimony, child support, a fair and
equitable division of the real and personal property, and
attorney's fees.
The case was tried before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on
December 22, 1988, and completed on January 19, 1989.

Each side

was represented by counsel and presented documentary evidence, as
well as their own testimonies.

In addition, Mr. Howell presented

the testimony of two witnesses, one who offered testimony
regarding the pension plans available to him, and the other who
offered testimony regarding the availability of employment to his

wife.

Mrs. Howell presented one additional witness who testified

as to the tax benefits available to her husband upon the payment
of alimony to her and as to the capital gains taxes which would
be assessed against the parties upon the sale of the California
home.

After hearing closing arguments, the trial court issued

its ruling.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Decree

of Divorce were signed and entered on May 12, 1989.
The ruling of the trial court applicable to the issues on
appeal was as follows:
1.

It awarded defendant alimony in the amount of $1,800.00

per month, payable in two equal payments on the 1st and 15th days
of each month, until the defendant remarried, cohabited or until
further order of the Court.
2.

It ordered that the California home be sold, and that

the equity remaining in the home, after cost of sale, be divided
equally between the parties.
Copies of the Findings, Conclusions and Decree are attached
hereto in the Addendum as Exhibits "A" and "B" and by reference
incorporated herein.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion to Amend the
Judgment or for Relief From the Judgment, which was denied on
August 31, 1989. Defendant filed her Notice of Appeal on
September 28, 19 89.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
MARITAL HISTORY
The parties were married on October 14, 1956, in Cushing,

Oklahoma (Tr. 31). Shortly after their marriage, Mr. Howell
began working for Western Airlines as a pilot (Tr. 38). During
the marriage, the parties moved a number of times, (Tr, 39) and
Mrs. Howell was primarily a full-time homemaker and mother, only
working now and then on a part-time basis (Tr. 78). Five
children were born as issue of this marriage, and at the time of
trial, four were emancipated and one was a minor child, namely
Sean Daniel Howell, born August 21, 1972 (Tr. 31). The parties
separated on November 22, 1986.
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
From 19 5 7 through 19 84, Mr. Howell was employed as an
airline pilot for Western Airlines.

Western Airlines was taken

over by Delta Airlines in 1985, and he was thereafter employed as
an airline pilot for Delta Airlines from 1985 through the time of
trial (Tr. 40). In 1984,- plaintiff's employer, then Western
Airlines, suffered severe financial problems, and asked its
pilots to accept a wage reduction (Tr. 113). The parties agreed,
and as a result, the family experienced a financial strain during
that period of time (Tr. 217) because Mr. Howell received no
increases in compensation even though the cost of living was
increasing (Tr. 115). During the period 1981 through 1986, Mr.
Howell's average yearly income was approximately $67,000.00 or
$5,500.00 per month.
In 1986, after Delta took over operation of the airlines,
Mr. Howell began receiving increased compensation (Tr. 114). At
the time of trial in December of 1988, he was earning
A

approximately $10,120.00 per month (Tr. 45).
Defendant Mrs. Howell, at time of trial, was working as a
part-time sales clerk for Casual Furniture and was earning a
gross income of $649.80 per month (Tr. 75). This employment was
scheduled to end on December 31, 1988 because her employer was
going out of business. (Tr. 75).

Despite defendant's

applications to several potential employers to find new
employment, she had not been hired as of the time of trial, due
to the fact that she did not have sufficient experience (Tr. 72).
Mrs. Howell graduated from high school in 1956, and has had
no formal training, with the exception of approximately 30 hours
of college courses taken at a junior college several years
earlier (Tr. 70). Throughout the marriage, her part-time
employment consisted primarily of unskilled labor, and included
working as an aid in a day care center (Tr. 73); working as a
secretary (Tr. 74); selling cosmetics (Tr. 74); working as a
switchboard operator (Tr. 75); and teaching piano lessons out of
her home (Tr. 72).
Mrs. Howell's monthly living expenses at time of trial were
$5,021.30 (Tr. 233-34) .
The Court made the following specific Findings related to
the plaintiff's income (Tr. 265):
5. At the time of the separation of the
parties, the plaintiff was earning between
$5,500.00 per month and $5,600.00 per month
and had been earning this sum for five years
prior to this time. . . .
6. The court believes the income level of
$5,500.00 reflects the income level and

living standards of the parties during the
last five years of their lives together.
7. The plaintiff earns, from his present
employment, a salary of $10,000.00 per month.
The court has determined in setting alimony
that while $5,500.00 per month represents the
living standards of the parties in the last 5
years of the marriage, when the parties
resided together, the ability of the
plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his
present income of $10,000.00 per month.
The Court made the following specific Finding related to the
defendant's earning ability (Tr. 265):
8. The defendant earns, or is capable of
earning, $7,500.00 per year, or $625.00 per
month. At the time of trial, defendant was
employed with Casual Furniture on a part-time
basis earning a gross income of $649.80 per
month, although that employment was scheduled
to end on December 31, 1988 and she had not
yet secured replacement employment.
CALIFORNIA RESIDENCE
During the marriage, the parties acquired two homes, one in
California (Tr. 57) and one in Utah (Tr. 58). The court found
that the California home was valued at $290,000.00 (Tr. 248) with
a current mortgage of $23,631.00 (Tr. 248). The court also found
that the Utah home was valued at $140,000.00 (Tr. 248) with a
current mortgage of $123,000.00 (Tr. 248). Mr. Howell testified
at trial that he wanted to sell the California home and divide
the remaining equity (Tr. 103). Mrs. Howell testified at trial
that she wanted to reside in the California home for personal as
well as financial reasons (Tr. 214-216).

She also called Mark

Papanikolas, a certified public accountant and certified
financial planner (Tr. 165-166) as an expert to testify as to the
6

Plaintiff's tax benefits derived from the payment of alimony and
as to the parties' potential tax liability on the sale of the
California home.

He testified that, based on Mr. Howell's 1988

payroll schedule, he would enjoy a substantial tax benefit by his
payment of alimony (Tr. 199). For every dollar paid, Mr. Howell
would save 33 cents (Tr. 199).
Mr. Papanikolas also testified that the capital gains tax on
the realized equity from the sale of the California home would
total $23,400.00 (Tr. 201). His testimony also addressed the IRS
requirements for qualifying for a tax exclusion or for "rolling
over" this tax, one of which is that the California residence
must be the primary residence of the parties (Tr. 184-185).
On this issue, Mr. Papanikolas stated as follows:
I don't think that it's possible to conclude
affirmatively that the California home would
be their primary residence unless Mr. and
Mrs. Howell could prove that it was always
their intent to return to California and to
live in that home and the move to Salt Lake
was temporary, and a number of things in line
with that, then it would possible that that
could be considered a primary residence.
The Internal Revenue Service may well take
the position if the return were audited, when
the home was sold, that that was not their
primary residence because they moved to Salt
Lake City because they purchased another home
here and abandoned that as their primary
residence. So I think it would be very
difficult to say that you could use the
provisions of Section 1034 to roll over any
gain.
(Tr. 185 Lines 4-18).
Even if the parties could establish that the California

7

residence was their primary residence and thereby qualify to roll
over the capital gains taxes incurred on its sale, Mrs. Howell
testified that she was afraid that she would be financially
unable to purchase another home in California, of greater value
so as to roll over her capital gains taxes at that time (Tr.
215-216).

Therefore, she requested the court to address the

capital gains taxes as an expense
the property sold.

in the event the court ordered

In the alternative, she asked the court to

consider the parties1 disparate ability to pay the tax and to
adjust the division of equity accordingly (Tr. 198). The court
failed to consider either option.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court's award of alimony failed to take into

consideration the three factors relevant to alimony:

(1)

the

needs of Mrs. Howell, which were established at $5,021.30 per
month;

(2)

her inability to meet those needs on her own due to

her age, limited work experience and lack of formal education and
skills; and (3)

Mr. Howell's substantial ability to pay alimony

based on his income at time of trial, in excess of $10,000.00 per
month.
2.

The award should be vacated and increased.
The trial court erred by failing to measure the parties'

standard of living based on their income and needs at the time of
trial.

Instead the trial court based it on a life style

maintained by the parties during a period when Mr. Howell's
income was unusually low.

Therefore, the alimony award should be

vacated and increased, and this court should articulate a method
8

as to how and when the parties' standard of living should be
measured.
3.

The trial court failed to consider the immediate and

concrete tax consequences precipitated by the court ordered sale
of the California residence.

As this failure resulted in an

inequitable division of the net equity resulting from that sale,
the property division as to the California residence should be
vacated and the issue remanded.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE
DISPARITY IN THE PARTIES1 INCOMES, THE LENGTH
OF THE MARRIAGE, AND THE RESPECTIVE EARNING
ABILITIES AND EXPENSES OF THE PARTIES IN
MAKING ITS ALIMONY AWARD
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving spouse to
maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage and prevent the spouse from becoming a public
charge."

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); Jones

v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
In making its alimony award, the court must consider all
relevant factors affecting one spouse's ability to provide for
herself and the other's ability to pay support.

As summarized by

the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah
1985) :
An alimony should, as far as possible,
equalize the parties1 respective standards of
living and maintain them at a level as close

9

as possible to the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage. In determining the
amount of alimony to be awarded, it was
necessary for the trial court to consider the
financial condition and needs of the
plaintiff, her ability to produce a
sufficient income for herself/ and the
ability of the defendant to provide support.
Id. at 566 (footnotes omitted).
Pursuant to this standard, the lower court in this case
abused its discretion in awarding a lower amount of alimony to
Mrs. Howell than her needs, and than the plaintiff's ability to
provide, would mandate.

The court found that, for the purposes

of awarding alimony, the plaintiff's income averaged $5,600.00
per month during the years 1981 through 1986, the last five years
the parties resided together during their marriage.

However, it

based Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony on his income at time of
trial, $10,120.00 per month (Tr. 265). At the time of trial, Mrs.
Howell was earning $645.00 per month and her living expenses were
over $5,000.00 per month (Tr. 229).
In addition to child support of $1,363.00, the court awarded
Defendant monthly alimony in the amount of $1,80 0.00.

The minor

child will turn 18 on August 21, 1990, and the child support
payment will terminate.

If we analyze the court's award of

alimony under the three factors set forth in Olsen v. Olsen,
suprj*, as well as the cases of Asper v. Asper, 753 P. 2d 978 (Utah
App. 1988); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 144 (Utah App. 1988);
and Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Utah App. 1988), it is
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clear the court abused its discretion, and Mrs. Howell is
entitled to a greater amount of alimony.
First of all, the court must consider the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse. At the time of the
trial, Mrs. Howell was employed on a part-time basis as a
furniture sales clerk, earning $7.00 per hour (Tr. 75). Her
employment was scheduled to terminate on December 31, 1988, due
tQ the fact that the store was closing (Tr. 75). At trial, Mrs.
Howell testified that her monthly living expenses were $5,021.30,
and these were compiled from actual expenses recorded in her
check book register (Tr. 233). She had been unable to make ends
meet with the combined amount of temporary support of $2,400.00
per month that she had been receiving from the Plaintiff, and her
own small salary (Tr. 211). In fact, she had to borrow money to
meet her expenses on two separate occasions (Tr. 215). Mrs.
Howell asked the court for an award of alimony in the amount of
$3,500.00 per month, and an additional amount of $500.00 for
child support. As in the Sampinos case, supra, there were no
income producing assets awarded to the defendant in the divorce,
and her only means of support would be the small income she could
generate through her own efforts, and any additional amounts the
court ordered plaintiff to pay.
The second factor to be considered by the court is the
defendant's ability to produce sufficient income for herself.

In

the instant case, Mrs. Howell has a high school education,
nominal additional formal training, and limited work experience.
11

At the time of trial, she was in her mid-fifties, with no
professional training and limited marketable skills.

Her limited

work experience, during the 32 years of the parties1 marriage,
was in relatively unskilled jobs.

During most of the marriage,

including the separations, Mrs. Howell devoted her time to
raising the parties1 children and maintaining the parties1 home.
It is unrealistic to assume that Mrs. Howell, in light of her age
and limited work experience and training, would be able to enter
the work force and support herself in a style resembling that
which she would have had if the marriage had continued.

Needless

to say, the standard of living she would have enjoyed had the
marriage continued would have been based on an annual income in
excess of $120,000.00.

At the time of trial, Plaintiff's income

exceeded $10,000.00 per month.

The alimony award of $1,800.00 is

less than one-fifth of Plaintiff's monthly income, and not an
adequate amount to allow Defendant to meet her basic needs and
expenses much less maintain a comparable standard of living.
The last factor the court must consider in making an award
of alimony is the paying spouse's ability to provide support.
The record clearly demonstrates the Plaintiff's ability to
provide adequate support for the Defendant.

Based upon his

monthly income at time of trial which was in excess of $10,000.00
per month, it is clear that he has an ability to pay defendant a
greater amount of support than what was awarded.

In addition,

uncontroverted evidence at trial established that Mr. Howell

1 O

would realize a substantial tax benefit of 33 cents for every
dollar of alimony paid to his wife.
In light of Mrs. Howell's financial needs, her inability to
meet those needs and Mr. Howell's substantial ability to pay, the
court abused its discretion in only awarding Mrs. Howell alimony
in the amount of $1,800.00 per month.

This court should vacate

that award and enter its own award based on the evidence
contained in the record.

In the alternative, this court should

remand to the lower court for a redetermination of an adequate
award of alimony.

In either event, the increase of alimony award

should be made retroactive to the date of trial.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY
BASED UPON ITS MEASUREMENT OF THE PARTIES'
STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE YEARS 1981 TO
1986
The court found that Mr. Howell's ability to pay alimony was
based upon his monthly income at time of trial of $10,000.00.
However, inconsistently with this finding, the court determined
that the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the
marriage was based on Mr. Howell's average income from 1981 to
1986 of $5,500.00 per month.

This figure represented the reduced

compensation the parties agreed to accept from Western Airlines
knowing that their income level would substantially increase once
the take over of Western by Delta was accomplished.

This

measurement of the standard of living was an abuse of discretion.
Utah law requires consideration of the standard of living
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage in making a
13

determination of the amount of alimony to be awarded to the
recipient spouse.

For example, in the case of Naranjo v.

Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988) the Utah Court of Appeals
stated:
[Alimony] should, so far as possible,
equalize the parties1 'respective standards
of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage.1 (citations
omitted) f[T]he ultimate test of the
propriety of an alimony award is whether,
given all of these factors, the party
receiving alimony will be able to support
him- or herself as nearly as possible to the
standard of living . . . enjoyed during the
marriage.f
Id. at 1147.

(citations omitted).

Although the courts mandate this consideration of the
standard of living in fashioning an alimony award, Utah courts
have never defined the term or articulated a formula for
measuring a specific standard of living.

One case even suggests

that the appropriate standard is that which the parties would
have enjoyed had the marriage continued.

In Savage v. Savage,

658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Where a marriage is of long duration and the
earning capacity of one spouse greatly
exceeds that of the other, as here, it is
appropriate to order alimony and child
support at a level which will insure that the
supported spouse and children may maintain a
standard of living not unduly disportionate
to that which they would have enjoyed had the
marriage continued.
Id. at 1205 (emphasis added)

(See also Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751

P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988)).

14

This inconsistency and lack of a precise definition is
generally not a problem because the standard of living enjoyed by
the parties during the marriage is usually comparable to that
which exists at the time of trial.

However, in this case, the

parties had accepted a temporary reduction in compensation in
exchange for retention of Mr. Howell's employment and the
expectation of substantially increased compensation in the
future.

During the years 1981 to 1986, the parties suffered

financial strain as a result of this decision and did not enjoy
the standard of living at that time which they anticipated they
would enjoy in the future.

However, the court used an average

yearly income over that five-year period to arrive at a standard
of living based on an average income of $5,500.00 per month.
This was error in several respects.
First, the lower income level was a result of the parties1
conscious decision to defer present benefits in exchange for
greater future benefits.
Second, Mr. Howell was receiving the increased benefits as
early as 1987, and at time of trial in December of 1988 was
earning in excess of $10,000.00 per month, or nearly double the
yearly average used by the court.
Third, under the standard outlined in Savage, supra, the
court must consider the standard of living the parties would have
enjoyed had the marriage continued.
Finally, a determination of the standard of living at the
time of trial would be consistent with the requirement that
1 S

marital assets be valued at time of trial.

In Berger v. Berger,

713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that "[t]he
marital estate should be valued at the time of the divorce
decree."

Id. at 697.

(See also Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d

1218 (Utah 1980) .
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's use of a standard
of living based on Mr. Howell's past income of $5,500.00 per
month was error and an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, the award

of alimony to the Defendant should be vacated, and this court
should award Defendant an amount of alimony consistent with the
evidence presented at trial, or in the alternative, remand the
issue to the trial court.

In either event, this court must

provide guidance, define the term and time frame to be used, or
articulate a formula for the trial court to measure an accurate
standard of living.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
CAPITAL GAINS TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE SALE OF
THE CALIFORNIA RESIDENCE PRIOR TO DIVIDING
THE NET EQUITY DERIVED FROM THAT SALE
Trial courts are granted broad discretion to equitably
divide marital assets pursuant to Utah statutory and case law.
An even distribution of assets is not always required to achieve
equity and fairness.

Courts have long recognized that expenses

of an asset should be deducted prior to a determination and
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division of the net equity in that asset.

For example, in the

case of Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's deduction of the
expense of the anticipated real estate commission prior to the
division of the equity in the marital home.

In so doing, the

court stated:
The deduction of anticipated real estate
charges seems to be reasonable as each party
was charged with half of those charges. 'In
the distribution of the marital estate, there
is no fixed rule or formula. . . . The
responsibility of the trial court is to
endeavor to provide a just and equitable
adjustment of their economic resources so
that the parties might reconstruct their
lives on a happy and useful basis.'
Id. at 982 (quoting Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah
1978)) .
Although the Utah courts have not addressed the
consideration and treatment of tax consequences resulting from a
court ordered sale of a marital asset, the issue has been
addressed in other jurisdictions.

One of the earliest cases in

which the issue of taxes was addressed is In re Marriage of
Epstein, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413, 592 P.2d 1165 (Cal. 1978).
of this case is included in the addendum as Exhibit "C" .

A copy
In that

case, the wife appealed the trial court's order that the family
residence be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the
parties.

She argued that the trial court erred by not expressly

considering tax liability in the division of those proceeds.
Supreme Court of California agreed and stated:

17

The

The trial court's order does not mention the
possibility that the parties might incur
state and federal capital gains tax liability
as a result of the sale of the residence.
Noting that equalization of community
property shares before taxes may result in
her receiving less than half of the net value
of community property remaining after payment
of taxes, wife contends the trial court erred
by not expressly considering tax liability in
its order. We agree with wife that the
court's division of community property should
take account of any taxes actually paid as a
result of the court ordered sale of the
residence . . .
Id. at 1171.

Although the court found that the trial court's

order could be interpreted so as to avoid reversible error, and
although California is a community property state unlike Utah,
the principal outlined by the California Supreme Court is
applicable to this case.

The case concluded that the trial court

must consider tax consequences where a taxable event has occurred
during the marriage or will occur in connection with the division
of property.
The Supreme Court of Montana was faced with a similar issue
in the case of In re Marriage of Beck, 631 P.2d 282 (Mont. 1981).
A copy of this case is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "D".
In that case the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court
must consider the concrete and immediate tax consequences
precipitated by a court ordered sale of marital property.
holding, the court stated:
[W]here a property distribution ordered by a
court includes a taxable event precipitating
a concrete and immediate tax liability, such
tax liability should be considered by the
court before entering its final judgment.
18

In so

In re Marriage of Gilbert, (1981), Mont. 628
P.2d 1088, 38 St. Rep. 743, we held that a
District Court does not abuse its discretion
by refusing to consider theoretical tax
consequences when the court-ordered property
distribution does not contemplate any taxable
event which triggers present tax liability.
But where a present tax liability will be
triggered by the court-ordered distribution,
the court must make allowance for such
impact. Other courts have held that a
property distribution must make allowance for
the tax impact incurred by a husband on
account of a court ordered transfer of an
interest in real property to the wife. See,
e.g., Wahl v. Wahl, (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 510,
159 N.W.2d 651. See generally, Annot. Divorce
or Separation; Consideration of tax
liability or consequences in determining
alimony or property settlement provisions, 51
A.L.R. 3rd 461. We hold, therefore, that at
a new hearing, the trial court must consider
any concrete and" immediate adverse tax impa"ct
that a division of marital property might
have on the parties.
Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
These cases are consistent with what has been outlined as
the generally accepted rule with respect to the deduction of
expenses prior to a division of net equity in a marital asset.
This general rule has been outlined in 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and
Separation, § 926.

This section states:

While the courts generally recognize the
rule, also stated in some statutes, that the
tax consequences of any equitable
distribution is a factor to be considered by
the court, since disregarding the effect of
taxes may result in an unrealistic and unjust
result, it has frequently been said that a
court is not required to consider theoretical
tax consequences of transactions that are not
necessary or probable but merely conjectural.
Thus, in making an equitable distribution, a
court need not take into account the fact
that the husband is in the 50% tax bracket
1 ft

where the divorce itself does not cause
immediate taxable consequences. And it is
too speculative to reduce the value of assets
based on alleged tax consequences of the
selling husband's assets for purposes of the
property division in the absence of a showing
of what assets would have to be sold at any
given time. On the other handy where the
sale of real estate is required or is likely
to occur within a short time after
dissolution, the court should consider the
tax consequences.
(Footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
Although the Utah courts have not specifically ruled on this
issue, the courts have recognized that tax liability is an issue
where there is evidence that such tax liability is concrete and
immediate.

In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the

Utah Supreme Court sanctioned the trial court's reservation of
the issue of which party would bear the tax liability associated
with the court ordered transfer of stock until such time as the
liability could be specifically determined.

(See Savage, 658

P.2d at 1204) .
Applying these principals to the case currently on appeal,
the trial court erred in not considering the capital gains tax
consequences to both parties from the sale of the California
residence for the following reasons.

First, the sale of the

residence was a court ordered sale, and the parties' tax
liability could be determined within a short period after final
dissolution, thereby making the liability neither theoretical nor
speculative.

Second, Defendant's expert testified that the tax

liability, based on the values adduced at trial, would be

20

$23,400.00.

Third, he also testified that there was some

uncertainty as to whether the parties could qualify to roll over
any gains realized and therefore avoid paying the tax.

Finally,

Mrs. Howell testified that she could not afford a home of greater
value in order to personally avoid the tax consequences.
In light of these circumstances, the court's failure to
consider the tax consequences of the court ordered sale of the
marital residence was reversible error.

As a result, Mrs.

Howell's ultimate share of equity in the home will be diminished
and the property division rendered inequitable.

The court should

have considered the tax consequences as an expense of sale, or in
the alternative, adjusted the division of the net equity to
compensate Mrs. Howell for her disparate ability to pay the tax.
Either option was necessary to achieve fairness.

This court

should vacate the division of net equity in the California home
and remand the issue for a redetermination in light of the
concrete and immediate tax consequences precipitated by the sale
of real property.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in two respects:

its inadequate award

of alimony and its inequitable division of the net equity in the
California home.
This was a 32-year marriage, and the disparity between the
parties1 respective earnings was enormous.

At time of trial, Mr.

Howell was earning in excess of $120,000.00 per year.

Mrs.

Howell, by comparison, was earning approximately $7,500.00 per
21

year.

Due to her limited education, and lack of marketable

skills Mrs. Howell is not capable of earning a greater amount.
The trial court only awarded Mrs. Howell $1,800.00 per month
as alimony in the face of monthly expenses which exceeded
$5,000.00.

The trial court also erred by measuring the standard

of living available to the parties based on Mr. Howell's income
during the years 1981 through 1986, instead of on the parties1
respective incomes at time of trial.
The court should vacate the alimony order, and make its own
increased award consistent with the evidence in the record.

In

the alternative, the issue should be remanded to the trial court,
with specific instruction on the proper measurement of the
standard of living applicable to an award of alimony.

In either

event, the increased alimony award should be made retroactive to
the date of trial.
The trial court also erred in dividing the net equity from
the sale of the California residence without considering the
immediate and concrete tax consequences, precipitated by that
sale.

As a result, its division of that equity was inequitable

and should be vacated and remanded.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of February, 1990.

^ L H / J J ^ ^ I S (USB # 1956)
HELEN W. CHRISTIAN (USB # 2247)
KIM M. LUHN (USB # 5105)
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ADDENDUM

; DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
; COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
i Attorneys for Plaintiff
I 525 East 100 South, Suite 500
!
P.O. Box 11008
i Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
' Telephone: (801) 532-2666
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
!

* * * * *

; WALTER JAMES HOWELL,
1

Plaintiff,

• BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL,
j

Defendant.

|:

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
)
)

Civil No. D87-4343
Judge Frank Noel

* * * * *

jj

i|
i|

The above-entitled

j; trial

on Thursday,

the

matter
22nd

came

day of

l"j Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding.

before

the court for

December,

1988, the

The plaintiff was present

l| in person and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz and
•i

!! J o h n Mason.
The defendant was present i n p e r s o n and
il represented by counsel, Paul H. Liapis.
The court heard and

H

j considered the testimony of the parties, received exhibits
ji
ij into evidence and determined to take the matter under
11

|| advisement.

Thereafter,

being advised in the premises, the

EXHIBIT

&

j] court announced its decision in open court on the 19th day of
||

j| January, 1989* The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings
j|
jj of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree to the court,
||

|i provisions t o which defendant objected.

Those objections were

ij
I heard

and

resolved

before the

court

on April

27, 1989.

jl Accordingly, the court now makes and enters the following as

si lts
.
I!

ji
II
!i

FINDINGS OF FACT

;j

1.

The defendant was a resident of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, when this action was filed and had been so for
I more than three months immediately prior thereto.
I

2.

The parties

are husband

and wife, having been

I married on October 14, 1956, in Cushing, Oklahoma.
I

3.

Irreconcilable

differences

arose

between the

j parties which they attempted to reconcile, but were unable to
i!

jl do so.
ji

4.

There were five (5) children born as issue of this

j marriage; four

(4) are emancipated.

Both of the parties

! agreed that care, custody and control of the one (1) remaining
!| minor child of the parties, Sean Daniel Howell, born August
|l 21, 1972, age 16, should be awarded to the defendant, subject
|! to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff.

The

defendant is a fit and proper parent to be awarded the care,
jl custody and control of the minor child of the parties.

IIi!

!!

2

\\
• i

»!

II

!i11
i;
h

ii
j!

5.

At the time of the separation of the parties, the

:i

j! p l a i n t i f f
ji

was

ji $5, 600. 00 per
• i years

prior

earning
month

to

this

between

and had

been

time.

$5,500.00
earning

After

per

month

and

this

sum

for

five

separation,

the

plaintiff

i filed an action for divorce which he dismissed at trial; that
after

a

two-day

attempted

reconciliation,

he

filed

this

j; action.
;|

6.

The court believes

the income level

of $5, 500. 00

''reflects the income level and living standards of the parties
;! during the last five years of their lives together.
!i

7.

The plaintiff earns, from his present employment,

is a salary of $10,000.00 per month.
The court has determined in
ii
'j setting alimony that while $5,500.00 per month represents the
ji
j; living standards of the parties in the last 5 years of the

I:
j| marriage,

when the parties

resided together,

the

ability

of

ji
|i the plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his present income
ii
jl of $10,000.00 per month.
jl
8.
The defendant e'arn0# or is capable of earning,
!!

j| $7, 500. 00 per

year,

or

$625.00

per

month.

At

the

time

of

|| trial, defendant was employed with Casual Furniture on a partji time

basis

earning

a

gross

income

of

$649. 80

per

month,

'although that employment was scheduled to end on December 31,
!i

J| 1988 and she had not yet secured replacement employment.
Il
9.
A p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Child Support Guidelines
3

adopted by the courts of the State of Utah would require the
payment of child support from the plaintiff to the defendant
in

the

sum

of

$1, 363. 00 per

month

based

upon plaintiff s

income of $10,000. 00 per month until Sean attains the age of
18 and graduates from high school with his regularly-scheduled
graduating class.
10.

The plaintiff filed separate tax returns in 1986

and 1987 and the defendant has not filed tax returns for those
years.
11.

The parties acquired, during the course of their

marriage, a home and real property located in California, towit:

1767 Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, which was the

primary residence of the parties prior to their move to Utah
in 1984; a home and real property located in Utah, to-wit:
8241 Top of the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah; seven (7)
lots in the state of Texas; interests in a series of pension
plans maintained by the employer of the plaintiff, to-wit:
Western Airlines

and

Delta Airlines,

Western Airlines

Plan A,

(these plans

the Western Airlines

are the

Plan B, the

Western Airlines Plan D, the Delta Plan and the Delta Savings
Plan); and an interest in a military retirement plan, part of
which was earned prior to the marriage; three IRA accounts,
one in the name of the plaintiff for $7, 546. 57, a second in
the name of the plaintiff in the sum of $4,196. 43 and one in
4

;j the name of the defendant for $10, 397. 00; bank accounts at
I; Western Federal Credit Union, Ranier Bank, Valley Bank, Mt.
: i

J! West Savings, and Camarillo Community Bank; 8. 6023 shares of
il Delta

stock;

stock in Continental

Power Co. ; furniture,

j;
ji

j; fixtures, furnishings

and appliances;

five guns;

an IBM

' computer and software; a 1977 Buick automobile; a 1987 Ford
|: truck and camper; a 1980 Datsun 280Z; a 1978 ski boat; a 1982
;' fold boat and motor; several pieces of ivory; and a 35mm
i;
;! camera.
!
|
12. The plaintiff testified that the precise term of
i,
i
the military retirement plan is being re-examined by the

Ij
!I United States Navy, as plaintiff was in the Naval Reserve
j prior to going on active duty and this period of time should
M

j; have been included in the plan calculations but had not, as
of the date of trial, and this determination had been appealed
and was being reviewed by the Navy.
II

13.

After separation of the parties, the plaintiff

*j withdrew $33, 000. 00 from a retirement fund which was expended
I;

! to pay for marital debts of the parties, to-wit: $16,000.00

i|
|! to repay a loan $3, 400. 00 on the VISA account; $12, 500. 00 to
pay income taxes; $1,000.00 on their daughter's wedding; and
$600.00 to refinance the parties' home.
14. The parties acquired various debts which remain
unpaid, to-wit:

Tracy Collins Bank
Camarillo Community Bank
Defendant's Personal Loan (attorney's fees)
Camarillo Bank VISA
Nordstroms
Weinstocks
ZCMI
Western Federal Credit Union
Western Federal Credit Union for camper
Security Pacific Solar Loan
Valley Bank VISA
State of California taxes.
15.

The plaintiff has two life insurance policies, one

with Delta Airlines for $100,000.00 and one with Beneficial
i

, Life Insurance for $100,000.00.
j

16.

The defendant employed counsel t o r e p r e s e n t her i n

i t h i s matter and does not have a ready source of a s s e t s

from

; which she can pay for the s e r v i c e s whicfr she has secured.
j

17.

The

plaintiff

has

available,

through

his

i

I employment, health and dental insurance and will maintain
| health and dental insurance for Walter and Sean as long as it
I is available through his employment.
I

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now

j makes and enters the following
j

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and

subject matter of this action.
|

2.

Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of

Divorce, terminating the marriage between them on the grounds
I of irreconcilable differences.

3.

Care, custody and control of the

minor child of

the parties, Sean Howell, should be awarded to the defendant,
subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff.
4.

The plaintiff

should be ordered to pay child

support to the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1, 363. 00
per month until Sean is 18 and graduated from high school with
his regularly-scheduled class.

Payments should be made on the

20th of each month.
5.

The income exemption for Sean should be awarded to

the defendant.
6.

The plaintiff should be ordered to pay alimony to

the defendant based upon the standard of living enjoyed by the
parties at the time of their separation in 1986.

Accordingly,

he should pay her $1,800. 00 per month, one-half on the 5th of
each month; one-half on the 20th of each month until such
time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom she
is not married, or further order of the court.
7.

The parties

should divide the retirement plan

benefits acquired by them during the course of their marriage
at the value determined by this court on December 22, 1988, by
appropriate qualified domestic relations order, that is, the
Western Airlines Plan A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta
Savings Plan and Delta Plan, which should be effected by
separate orders to implement the provision of the Decree of
7

Divorce.
8.
finally

The military retirement plan of the parties, once
valued

and

the

period

of

service

set,

divided by application of the Woodward formula.

should

be

The plaintiff

should keep the defendant advised as to the progress of this
inquiry and the actions and decisions

of the United States

Navy.
9.

Plaintiff should be awarded the IRA in his name at

Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7, 546. 57 and the IRA at the
Western Federal Credit Union of $4,196.43, and the defendant
should be awarded her IRA in the amount of $10,397.00.
10.

The plaintiff should be ordered to maintain the

health and dental insurance that is available to him through
his employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, so
long as that insurance is available to him through the age of
21.

Each

of

the

parties

should

pay

one-half

of

any

extraordinary medical, dental, orthodontic or eyecare expense
which is not covered by insurance.
11.

The plaintiff has available to him life insurance

in the sum of $100,000.00.

He should be required to maintain

Matthew and Sean as beneficiaries of that policy until they
attain the age of 21 years or are married.

After that occurs,

he shall be free to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of
that

insurance.

To

assist

the
8

children

in

assuring

this

ji
t:

;l

' coverage, the plaintiff should provide them with the policy
\[ number and name of the insurance company.
12.

The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with

• the defendant in making available to her all health insurance
; benefits for which she can qualify under the COBRA provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code.
ii

;

13.

The home and real property in California, at 1767

Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, should be sold for the
i best possible price and at the earliest possible time.
!| net proceeds

The

of sale divided equally between the parties.

• I There is presently a debt due to the State of California for
|: taxes.

If it is determined that those are property taxes,

I; they should be paid from the proceeds of sale of this property
ji prior

to division

of the proceeds

of sale.

If it is

i; determined that those are taxes for any other reason, the
'i

j; plaintiff should assume and pay those taxes and hold the
l•
'! defendant harmless therefrom.
The plaintiff should be
i:

i! responsible for the sale of the California home, and should
jj keep the defendant fully advised as to that transaction, and
ij the defendant should take all actions necessary to effect

fi
Ij sale.
j|
14.

The home and real property in Utah should be

ij

, placed for sale at the best possible price and sold at the

i!
Ij earliest

possible

date.

The plaintiff

should

pay the

mortgage for the months of February, March and April,

198 9,

and if the January house payment has not been made, he should
make

that

payment.

Thereafter,

the

defendant

shall

responsible for those payments if the home is not sold.

be
The

defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale.
15.

The 8. 6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental

Power Stock should be awarded to the plaintiff.
16.

The parties should sell one of the seven lots in

Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each
should be awarded three of the remaining lots.
17.

Each

of

the

parties

have

accumulated

savings

accounts in their own names and they should be awarded those
savings, to-wit: the plaintiff should be awarded the Western
Federal Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the
Valley Bank account, while the defendant should be awarded the
Mountain West Savings account and the Camarillo Community Bank
account*
18.

The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick should

be awarded to the defendant who should also be awarded the
1980 Datsun 280Z.
19.

The 1987 Ford truck and camper should be awarded

to the plaintiff.
10

20.

The

1969

Ford

automobile

The

1978

ski

boat

should

be

awarded

to

Matthew.
21.

should

be

awarded

to

the

defendant.
22.

The 1982 fold boat and engine should be awarded to

the plaintiff.
23.

Each

of

the

parties

should

be

awarded

the

furnishings, fixtures, furniture and appliances in their own
possession with the exception of the IBM computer and computer
software in the plaintiff s possession which should be awarded
to the defendant and the 35mm camera which should be awarded
to the plaintiff.
24.

Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of

the ivory collection.
25.

Each

of the parties

should

be

ordered

to make

available family photographs in their possession to the other
for copying.

The photographs should be divided fairly between

them.
26.

The plaintiff has accounted for the $33, 000. 00 he

removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of
the marital estate as set forth above.
27.

Each of the parties should be ordered to assume
11

and pay the debts in their own name with the exception of the
mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that
the plaintiff should pay the mortgage on the California home
and may use the rent received from the California home until
its sale.

The plaintiff should pay the mortgage payments on

the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the
January payment, if that has not been paid.

Thereafter, the

defendant should be responsible for payment of that debt.
The plaintiff should pay the debts due and owing to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home);
Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up);
Western Federal Credit Union (camper);
Security Pacific solar loan;
Valley Bank VISA;
State of California taxes.

The defendant should pay the debts due and owing to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
28.
regarding
returns.
secure

Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home);
Tracy Collins Bank;
Camarillo Community Bank;
Personal loan (attorney fees);
Camarillo Bank VISA;
Nordstroms;
Weinstocks;
ZCMI.

The
the

parties

filing

should

of

consult

amended

joint

with
1986

an
and

accountant
1987 tax

If these can be filed and the parties save money and

a refund

in excess

of the

$2, 500. 00 that

has

been

received by the plaintiff, they should do so and divide all
refunds received in excess of the $2, 500. 00 which has already
12

been received by the plaintiff.
2 9.

The plaintiff should be ordered to pay on behalf

of the defendant the sum of $7, 500. 00 to assist her in the
payment of her attorney fees within thirty

(30) days from

entry of the Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

FRANK G. NOEL
District Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•

*

*

*

*

WALTER JAMES HOWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.

)
)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Civil No. D87-4343
Judge Frank Noel

* * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the court for
trial

on Thursday,

the

22nd day of December,

Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding.

1988, the

The plaintiff was present

in person and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz and
John

Mason.

The

defendant

was

present

represented by counsel, Paul H. Liapis.

in person and

The court heard and

considered the testimony of the parties, received exhibits
into

evidence

advisement.

and

determined

to take

the

matter

under

Thereafter, being advised in the premises, the

EXHIBIT

BL

court announced its decision in open court on the 19th day of
January, 1989.
of

Fact,

provisions

The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings

Conclusions

of

Law

and

of which the defendant

Decree

to the

court,

then objected.

Those

objections were heard and resolved before the court on April
27, 1989.

Accordingly, the court, having made and entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and

subject matter of this action,
2.

Each

of

the parties

is

awarded

a Decree of

Divorce, terminating their marriage.
3.
the

Care, custody and control of the

parties,

Sean

Howell,

is

awarded

minor child of

to the defendant,

subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff.
4.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay child support to

the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1, 363. 00 per month
on the 20th of each month until Sean is 18 and graduates from
high school with his regularly-scheduled class.
5.

The income exemption for Sean is awarded to the

defendant.
6.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to the

defendant in the sum of $1,800.00 per month, one-half on the
5th of each month; one-half on the 20th of each month until
2

such time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom
she is not married, or further order of the court.
7.

The

benefits,

valued

parties

shall

divide

as of December

the

retirement

plan

22, 1988, acquired by them

during the course of their marriage by appropriate qualified
domestic relations order, that is, the Western Airlines Plan
A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta Savings Plan and Delta
Plan, which shall be effected by separate orders to implement
the provision of the Decree of Divorce.
8.
finally

The military retirement plan of the parties, once
valued

and

the

period

of

service

divided by application of the Woodward formula.

set,

shall

be

The plaintiff

shall keep the defendant advised as to the progress of this
inquiry and the actions and decisions

of the United

States

Navy.
9.

Plaintiff

is

awarded

the

IRA

in

his

name

at

Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7,546.57 and the IRA at the
Western Federal Credit Union in the amount of $4,196.43, and
the defendant is awarded her IRA in the amount of $10,397.00.
10.
and

dental

The plaintiff is ordered to maintain the health
insurance

that is

available

to him through his

employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, through
the age of 21, so long as that insurance is available to him.
Each of the parties shall pay one-half of any extra-

3

ordinary

medical,

dental,

orthodontic

or eyecare expense

which is not covered by insurance.
11.

The plaintiff has available to him life insurance

in the sum of $100,000,00.

He shall maintain Matthew and Sean

as beneficiaries of that policy until they attain the age of
21 years or are married.

After that occurs, he shall be free

to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of that insurance.
To

assist

the

children

in

assuring

this

coverage,

the

plaintiff shall provide them with the policy number and name
of the insurance company.
12.

The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with

the defendant in making available to her all health insurance
benefits for which she can qualify under^the COBRA provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code.
13.

The home and real property in California, at 1767

Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, legally described as:
LOT 44, TRACT NO. 1359, in the County of
Ventura, State of California, as per Map
recorded in Book 35, Page 59 of Maps, in
the office of the County Recorder of said
county,
shall be sold for the best possible price and at the earliest
possible time.

The net proceeds of sale shall be divided

equally between the parties.

There is presently a debt due to

the State of California for taxes.
those

are property

taxes,

they
4

If it is determined that
shall

be paid

from the

proceeds of sale of this property prior to division of the
proceeds of sale.

If it is determined that those are taxes

for any other reason,

the plaintiff shall assume and pay

those taxes and hold the defendant harmless therefrom.

The

plaintiff shall be responsible for the sale of the California
home, and should keep the defendant fully advised as to that
transaction,

and

the

defendant

should

take

all

actions

necessary to effect the sale.
14,

The home and real property in Utah, at 8241 Top of

the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the adjacent lot,
legally described as:
(House)
(Lot)

LOT 18, TOP OF THE WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION;

BEG S 84 FT FR NE COR^OT 17, TOP OF THE
WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION; S 84 FT; E 100 FT;
W 100 FT TO BEG. 0. 2 AC M OR L;

shall be placed for sale at the best possible price and sold
at the earliest possible date.

The plaintiff shall pay the

mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 1989,
and if the January house payment has not been made, he shall
make

that

payment.

Thereafter,

the defendant

shall be

responsible for those payments if the home is not sold.

The

defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale.
15.

The 8.6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental
5

Power Stock are awarded to the plaintiff.
16.

The parties shall sell one of the seven lots in

Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each
is awarded three of the remaining lots.
17.
accounts

Each
in

of

their

the

parties

own

names

has

and

accumulated

they

are

savings

awarded

those

savings, to-wit: the plaintiff is awarded the Western Federal
Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the Valley
Bank account, while the defendant is awarded the
West

Savings

account

and

the

Camarillo

Mountain

Community

Bank

account.
18.

The

insurance

proceeds

for

the

1977

Buick

are

awarded to the defendant who is also awarded the 1980 Datsun
280Z.
19.

The 1987 Ford truck and camper are awarded to the

plaintiff.
20.

The 1969 Ford automobile is awarded to Matthew.

21.

The 1978 ski boat is awarded to the defendant.

22.

The 1982 fold boat and engine are awarded to the

plaintiff.
23.
fixtures,

Each of the parties is awarded the furnishings,
furniture

and appliances

in their own possession

with the exception of the IBM computer and computer software
in

the

plaintiff's

possession

which

are

awarded

to

the

defendant

and

the

3 5mm

camera

which

is

awarded

to

the

plaintiff.
24.

Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the

ivory collection,
25.
family

Each of the parties is ordered to make available

photographs

copying.

in

their

possession

to

The photographs are to be divided

the

other

for

fairly between

them,
26.

The plaintiff has accounted for the $33,000. 00 he

removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of
the marital estate as set forth above,
27.
the

debts

Each of the parties is ordered to assume and pay
in

their

own

name

with

the

exception

of

the

mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that
the plaintiff shall pay the mortgage on the California home
and may use the rent received from the California home until
its sale.

The plaintiff shall pay the mortgage payments on

the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the
January payment, if that has not been paid.

Thereafter, the

defendant shall be responsible for payment of that debt.
plaintiff shall pay the debts due and owing to:
a.
b.

Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home);
Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up);
7

The

c.
d.
e.
f.

Western Federal Credit Union (camper);
Security Pacific solar loan;
Valley Bank VISA;
State of California taxes.

and the defendant shall pay the debts due and owing to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
28.

Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home);
Tracy Collins Bank;
Camarillo Community Bank;
Personal loan (attorney fees);
Camarillo Bank VISA;
Nordstroms;
Weinstocks;
ZCMI.

The

parties

are

ordered

to

consult

with

an

accountant regarding the filing of amended joint 1986 and 1987
tax returns.

If these can be filed and the parties save money

and secure a refund in excess of the $2,500. 00 that has been
received by the plaintiff, they shall do so and divide all
refunds received in excess of the $2,500. 00 which has already
been received by the plaintiff.
29.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay on behalf of the

defendant the sum of $7, 500. 00 to assist her in the payment of
her attorney fees within thirty (30) days from entry of the
Decree of Divorce.
DATED t h i s

j olflay of

989.
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154 Cal.Rptr. 413
In re Charles Robert ROICK, a Judge of
the Municipal Court, on Retirement.
L.A. 31050.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Dec. 6, 1978.
BY THE COURT:
In this proceeding, the Commission on
Judicial Performance has filed its record
and recommendation that Judge Charles
Robert Roick be retired for disability within
the meaning of California Constitution, article VI, section 18, subdivision (c)(1).
Judge Roick, through his conservator, has
waived review and requested the immediate
entry of an appropriate order. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Judge Charles
Robert Roick be retired from the Municipal
Court, North County Municipal Court District, County of San Diego. (Cal Const.,
art. VI, § 18, subd. (c)(1).) This order is
final forthwith.
^/w\
Co I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

154 Cal.Rptr. 413
In re the MARRIAGE OF Elayne C. and
Leon J. EPSTEIN.
Leon J. EPSTEIN, Respondent,
v.
EJayne C, EPSTEIN, Appellant
S.F. 23933.
Supreme Court of California.
April 12, 1979.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing
May 17, 1979.
In marital dissolution proceeding, the
Superior Court, Marin County, Charles R.
Best, J., divided community property and
awarded spousal support, and wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J., held
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that: (1) rule that spouse is generally not
entitled to reimbursement for separate
funds utilized to meet community obligations does not apply to expenditures subsequent to separation; (2) case had to be
remanded to trial court for resolution of
factual questions determinative of whether
sums expended by husband after separation
to preserve and maintain family residence
were paid to fulfill husband's support obligations; (3) capital gains tax, if any. incurred as a result of sale of residence had to
be considered so as to equalize division of
community property after payment of tax;
(4) trial court erred in failing to require
husband to reimburse community for community funds withdrawn by him to pay
estimated taxes on his 1973 separate property income; (5) trial court did not abuse its
discretion in fixing spousal support at $750
per month, and (6) trial court abused its
discretion in terminating spousal support as
of April 15, 1981, in view of absence of
evidence that wife would be self-supporting
by that date.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Vacating 83 Cal.App.3d 55, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 595.
1. Husband and Wife <®=>262.1(4)
There exists presumption that, unless
agreement between parties specifies that
contributing party be reimbursed, party
who utilizes his separate property for community purposes intends a gift to the community.
2. Husband and Wife <s=>265
Although spouse is generally not entitled to reimbursement for separate funds
utilized to meet community obligations,
that rule does not apply to expenditures
subsequent to separation.
3. Husband and Wife <s=>4
Husband and wife assume mutual obligation of support upon marriage, and this
obligation is not conditioned on existence of
community support or income but, in fact,
upon exhaustion of community property or
income, spouse must utilize his or her sepa-
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rate property to provide for the support of
the other. West's Ann.Civ.Code, §§ 242,
5100, 5132.
4. Husband and Wife <$=»4
Upon exhaustion of community property or income, spouse must utilize his or her
separate property to provide for the support
of the other, and no statutory right mandates reimbursement for such expenditures.
West's Ann.Civ.Code, §§ 242, 5100, 5132,
5. Divorce <$=> 252.3(2)
A spouse who, after separation of parties, uses earnings or other separate funds
to pay preexisting community obligations
should be reimbursed therefor out of community property upon dissolution unless
there exists circumstances indicating that
reimbursement is inappropriate, such as
where payment was made under circumstances in which it would have been unreasonable to expect reimbursement or where
payment on account of preexisting community obligation constituted in reality discharge of the paying spouse's duty to support the other spouse or a dependent child
of the parties; disapproving contrary language in In re Marriage of Fischer, 78
Cal.App.3d 556, 146 Cal.Rptr. 384.
6. Divorce <s=*287
Where, following separation, husband
expended sums to preserve and maintain
family residence, but where trial court did
not determine whether husband's payments
constituted in reality a discharge in part of
his obligation of support, whether parties
separated by agreement, whether they entered into an agreement for support, and
whether husband should be estopped from
denying that his payments were in discharge of his duty to support, case had to be
remanded to superior court for additional
findings concerning whether husband was
entitled to reimbursement. West's Ann.
Civ.Code, § 5131.
7. Divorce <s=> 252.5(3)
Trial court's division of community
property should take account of any taxes
initially paid as a result of court-orderecl
sale of residence.

8. Divorce ®=>252.3(2)
Where sale of parties' residence occurs
as a result of enforcement of trial court'.:
order dividing community property and
where there exists possible future tax burden since if parties use proceeds to purchase
new residence, resulting deferral of capital
gains tax will reduce basis of new residence,
thereby possibly resulting in higher tax
when and if new residence is sold, possible
future tax burden is an example of speculative and uncertain tax consequences which
trial court need not consider in dividing
community property. West's Ann.Rev. &
Tax.Code, § 18095; 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954)
§ 1034(e).
9. Divorce <®=>254(1)
Where trial court's order dividing community property stated that, following reimbursement to husband for traceable separate funds used to maintain residence, balance of residence sale proceeds "shall be
divided between the parties in a fashion
which will equalize the division of the parties' community property," judgment was
susceptible of construction consistent with
principle that balance of proceeds should be
divided so as to equalize division of community property after payments of any capital
gains tax incurred upon sale of residence.
10. Divorce e=*265
When husband utilizes community
funds to pay taxes relating to his separate
property income, he must reimburse community for such sums.
11. Divorce <s=> 252.3(2)
Where, after separation, husband withdrew $2,250 from savings account, conceded
to contain only community funds, to make
his quarterly estimated income tax payment
on his 1973 salary and where all of husband's income earned during 1973, being
postseparation, was his separate property
and hence entire tax obligation attributable
to his 1973 earnings was his separate debt,
trial court erred in failing to charge husband's share of community property for
$2,250 withdrawn from savings account.
West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 5118.
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12. Divorce <s=>235
A trial court may abuse its discretion if
it accords to one spouse a continued standard of living significantly higher than it
accords to the other.
13. Divorce <3=> 240(1), 308
Where husband's overall net income
amounted to $2,600 per month, where husband claimed expenses totaling $1,750 per
month, including $350 per month to meet
cost of parties' daughter's college education,
where this left available income of $850 per
month, a sum less than the $950 awarded in
combined spousal and child support, and
where husband's income was inadequate
both to sustain two separate households at
standard of living previously enjoyed by
parties and to provide for daughter's college
education, trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife $950 in combined
spousal and child support.
14. Divorce c=> 245(1)
Where wife had no employment or job
training since 1954, where, prior to her marriage in 1954, wife had held only brief and
intermittent unskilled positions, where, although wife had earned bachelor of arts
degree and expressed willingness to seek
employment, she required considerable
training before she would be qualified to
compete in the job market, where, at time
of trial, wife was 48 years old without any
specific employment opportunities available
to he/, and where record was devoid of
evidence justifying inference that wife
would be self-supporting on or after April
15. 1981, trial court's decision to terminate
jurisdiction to amend spousal support after
April 15, 1981 was an abuse of discretion.
15. Divorce c=>247
Award of support beyond husband's
mandatory retirement date would not have
conflicted with equal division of community
property requirement of Civil Code section
subdivision.
West's
Ann.Civ.Code,
§ 4800(a).
16. Divorce <®=> 252.3(2)
There is no requirement excluding husband's half of community property as a
source of future award of spousal support.
West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 4800(a).

Roy A. Sharff, Stephen Adams, San
Francisco, and Bernard N. Wolf, Oakland,
for appellant.
Savitt & Adams, Verna A. Adams and
Nancy Sevitch, San Rafael, for respondent.
TOBRINER, Justice.
In this marital dissolution proceeding
both husband and wife challenge various
rulings of the trial court. We state briefly
our conclusions with respect to the issues
raised.
First, we explain that although a spouse
is generally not entitled to reimbursement
for separate funds utilized to meet community obligations, that rule does not apply to
expenditures subsequent to separation. Accordingly, husband may claim reimbursement for sums expended after separation to
preserve and maintain the family residence,
unless such sums were paid to fulfill husband's support obligations. The case must
be remanded to the trial court for resolution of the factual questions determinative
of that issue.
Second, the trial court ordered the family
residence sold and the proceeds, after repayment to husband of reimbursable expenditures, divided in a fashion that would
equalize the division of the community
property. We interpret this language as
permitting the court, upon the remand of
this cause, to take into account the capital
gains tax, if any, incurred as a result of
that sale so as to equalize the division of
community property after payment of that
tax.
Third, the trial court erred in failing to
require the husband to reimburse the community for community funds withdrawn by
him to pay estimated taxes on his 1973
separate property income.
Finally, while we find no abuse of discretion in the court's order fixing spousal support at $750 per month, its order terminating that support as of April 15, 1981, in the
absence of evidence that wife will be selfsupporting by that date, conflicts with our
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recent decision in In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 143 Cal.Rptr. 139,
573 P.2d 41.
1. Summary of facts.
The parties were married on August 8,
1954, and separated on April 15, 1972. At
the time of trial wife was 48 years old and
husband was 57. There were 2 children of
the marriage, a daughter, over 18 years old
at the time of trial and in college, and a
son, age 16, residing with wife.
Wife has had no employment or job training since 1954. Before marriage she had
held a temporary job as a doctor's receptionist for six months, had worked for her
father for a brief period in his business, and
for a wholesale firm in Los Angeles for
slightly less than a year. She had a B.A.
degree from the University of California,
where she had majored in social work. Although she had not sought employment or
job training during the two-and-one-halfyear interval between separation and trial,
attributing this fact to the demands of running the family home and responsibility for
the children, she intended to seek job training and employment in the future.

Maintains that because of this arrangement
^$ never sought an order for support
Pendente lite.

s

The trial court allowed the husband reimbursement for the money spent to maintain
t^s family residence during the separation
Period. It refused, however, to order the^
co
mmunity reimbursed for community
f^nds used by husband to pay estimatea*
ta
Xes on his postseparation income although
t
^at income was husband's separate property.
The court divided the community property awarding husband community personal
Property worth $98,509.60 and wife community personal property worth $19,695.55. It
d^ected sale of the family residence, valued
a
t $140,000. It ordered the proceeds of the
sa
4e applied first to reimburse husband for
^ceable separate funds used to maintain
t^at asset, with the balance "divided betw
een the parties in a fashion which will
dualize the division of the parties' commum
ty property."
finally, the trial court awarded spousal
su
kport to wife in the amount of $750 per
m(
*nth, retroactive to January 1, 1975, and
co
htinuing through April 14, 1981. The orde
** provided that spousal support would
te
hninate on April 15, 1981, and the court
w
%ld retain no further jurisdiction to
aw
ard spousal support. The court also ordered husband to pay child support for the
Parties' son living with the wife, in the sum
of
$200 a month. The award of child supP°rt terminated on August 23, 1976, when
^ son reached the age of 18.

The husband, a professor of psychiatry at
University of California Medical School,
also engages in part-time private practice
of psychiatry. His gross income from all
sources in 1973 totalled $67,000; his net
income from all sources after taxes, retirement and deduction for certain health and
life insurance'premiums amounted to about
$31,200.
After the parties separated, husband continued to provide to his wife approximately
5. Husband is entitled to reimbursement
$650 every month and in addition paid
for separate funds utilized to preutilities, telephone, department store bills,
serve and maintain the family resigardener, gasoline card, house insurance,
de/zee uxJess paid to d/scfasge 2i/s
douse taxes, ancf mortgage payment, fn
duty of support.
February 1974, he modified his monthly
payments, paying $950, from which wife was
I'l] Our decision in See v. See (1966) 64
expected to pay the expenses husband had CaL2d 778, 51 Cal.Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d 776
previously paid in addition to other inci- established a presumption that, unless an
dental expenses. Throughout the pendente a£l-eement between the parties specifies
lite period wife and the son, David, rethe contributing party be reimbursed,
mained in the family residence while hus- a barty who utilizes his separate property
band made all the mortgage, insurance, * or community purposes intends a gift to
and tax payments on the home.° Wife t n ^ community. Thus we said in See, "The
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basic rule is that the party who uses his
separate property for community purposes
is entitled to reimbursement from the community or separate property of the other
only if there is an agreement between the
parties to that effect." (64 Cal.2d at p. 785,
51 CaLRptr. at p. 893, 415 P.2d at p. 781;
Weinberg v. Weinberg (1967) 67 Cal.2d 557,
570, 63 Cal.Rptr. 13, 432 P.2d 709.)
[2] This court, however, has not previously addressed the applicability of this noreimbursement rule to the situation in
which, after separating, the party uses his
separate property for payments on preexisting community obligations. Upon examination we think the no-reimbursement rule in
See does not apply in such a situation.
Justification for the See presumption lies
in the natural characteristics and legal incidents of the marital relationship. The
strength of "the natural feelings of mutual
affection and generosity presumably attending the marital state" (In re Marriage
of Smith (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 725, 746, 145
Cal.Rptr. 205, 215) may alone provide a
basis for the inference that expenditures of
separate property in behalf of the community are intended as gifts.
[3,4] The legal incidents of marriage,
however, provide an additional basis for
such an inference. Husband and wife assume a mutual obligation of support upon
marriage. (See 'fciv.Code, § 5100.) This
obligation is not conditioned on the existence of community property or income. In
fact, upon exhaustion of the community
property or income a spouse must utilize his
or her separate property to provide for the
support of the other. (Civ.Code, §§ 242,
5132.) As we noted in See v. See, supra, 64
Cal.2d 778, 784, 51 Cal.Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d
776, no statutory right mandates reimbursement for such expenditures.

right to reimbursement together with basic
equity considerations1 led us to conclude
that the husband acts with a donative intent that transmutes his separate property
into community property. (See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 785, 51 Cal.Rptr. 888,
415 P.2d 776.)
[5] The recent Court of Appeal opinion
in In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 79 Cal.3d
725, 145 Cal.Rptr. 205, however, held 'hat
the no-reimbursement rule of See v. See did
not apply to payments made after the
spouses have separated. Upon consideration of that matter, we agree with the
conclusion of In re Marriage of Smith, and
adopt as the view of this court the following portion of the Court of Appeal opinion
of Justice Kaufman:
"The rule denying reimbursement in the
absence of an agreement therefor is based
largely on the presumption the paying
spouse intended a gift. (See See v. See,
supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 785, 51 Cal.Rptr. 888,
415 P.2d 776; cf. Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal.
583, 589-590, [296 P. 604, 77 A.L.R. 1015];
Ives v. Connacher, supra, 162 Cal. 174 at p.
177, 121 P. 394.) . . . When the parties have separated in anticipation of dissolution of the marriage, the rational basis for
presuming an intention on the part of the
paying spouse to make a gift is gone.

Similarly, we held that if a husband during marriage elects to utilize his separate
property instead of community property to
meet community expenses he may not claim
reimbursement. The absence of a statutory

"Moreover, the practical realities are that
almost all married couples have incurred
debts which are customarily paid out of
their earnings and that, upon separation of
the parties, their earnings, the usual, and
perhaps only, liquid community asset available for payment of debts, become their
respective separate property (Civ.Code,
§ 5118).
.
[W]hen, after separation, one of the spouses makes payments on
preexisting community debts out of earnings or other separate funds, if the no-reimbursement rule is applied, the result is that
community obligations which would otherwise be charged against community property and borne by the parties equally are

l- At the time of our decision husband had both
management and control of the community
property (former Civ.Code, § 172) as well as
the right to select the mode of living (former

Civ.Code, § 156). It was considered inequitable to allow the husband to burden the community assets by consistently living beyond the
means of the community.
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charged exclusively to the paying spouse.
Thus, application of the no-reimbursement
rule will discourage payment of community
debts after separation, exacerbate the financial and emotional disruption which all
too frequently accompanies the breakup of
a marriage and, perhaps, result in impairing
the credit reputations of both spouses.
"So, we are persuaded the rule disallowing reimbursement in the absence of an
agreement for reimbursement should not
apply and that, as a general rule, a spouse
who, after separation of the parties, uses
earnings or other separate funds to pay
preexisting community obligations should
be reimbursed therefor out of the community property upon dissolution. However,
there are a number of situations in which
reimbursement is inappropriate, so reimbursement should not be ordered automatically.
"Reimbursement should not be ordered if
payment was made under circumstances in
which it would have been unreasonable to
expect reimbursement, for example, where
there was an agreement between the parties the payment would not be reimbursed
or where the paying spouse truly intended
the payment to constitute a gift or, generally, where the payment was made on
account of a debt for the acquisition or
preservation of an asset the paying spouse
was using and <<£he amount paid was not
substantially in excess of the value of the
use.

pendent children. (Civ.Code, §§ 242, 4700.)
Similarly, the spouses owe to each other
mutual duties of support.
(Civ.Code,
§§ 242, 5100, 5132.) Following separation,
the preferred source for payment of support is the separate property of the supporting spouse that would have been community property if the spouses were not separated. (Civ.Code, § 4805.) Payment of a debt,
of course, may constitute payment of spousal or child support. (See Gay v. Gay, 146
Cal. 237, 243, 79 P. 885; Bushman v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.3d 177, 181-183, 108
Cal.Rptr. 765; In re Hendricks, 5 Cal.
App.3d 793, 797-798, 85 Cal.Rptr. 220; cf.
Civ.Code, § 4358.) When in fact it does,
reimbursement is inappropriate. (See v.
See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 784, 51 Cal.Rptr.
888, 415 P.2d 776.)" (79 Cal.App.3d at pp.
746-748, 145 Cal.Rptr. at pp. 215-216.)
(Fns, omitted.) 2
[6] In the instant case the trial court did
not determine whether husband's payments
constituted in reality a discharge in part of
his obligation of support Husband, however, maintains that we need not remand
the cause for a finding on this issue because
under Civil Code section 5131 he owed no
obligation of support.

"Likewise, reimbursement should not be
ordered where the payment on account of a
preexisting community obligation constituted in reality a discharge of the paying
spouse's duty to support the other spouse or
a dependent child of the parties. Both
spouses have a duty to support their de-

Civil Code section 5131 provides that "A
spouse is not liable for the support of the
other spouse when the other spouse is living
[apart] from the spouse by agreement unless such support is stipulated in the agreement." 3 To invoke the protection of this
section, therefore, husband must prove both
(a) that the spouses separated by agreement, and (b) that this agreement contained
no provision for support. The trial court
rendered no finding on either point, and the
evidence adduced on the matter is equivocal.4

2. Language contrary to these views in In re
Marriage of Fischer (1976) 78 Cal App 3d 556,
561-562, 146 Cal Rptr. 384 is disapproved

that the duty of support continues after separation unless there is an agreement to the contrary

3. Bruch, The Legal Import of Informal Marital 4. The parties testified to an "arrangement" unSeparations: A Survey of California Law and a
der which husband paid mortgage, insurance,
Call for Change (1977) 65 Cal L.Rev. 1015,
real property taxes, and other expenses.
1030-1031, calls for legislative amendment of
Whether this evidence is sufficient to prove an
section 5131; the writer argues that the statute
implied contract for support is an issue for the
would more closely conform to the reasonable
trial court. We note also a dearth of evidence
expectations of separated spouses if it provided
on whether the parties separated "by agree-
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Because this case was tried before In re
Marriage of Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d
725, 145 Cal.Rptr. 205, the parties did not
orient their presentation of evidence to the
issues which Smith found to be crucial to
the husband's right to reimbursement, and
the trial court rendered no findings on
those issues. The issues thus left unresolved include the crucial question whether
husband's payments for maintenance of the
family home were made in discharge of his
support obligation5 which may turn on the
subsidiary questions whether the parties
separated "by agreement" (Civ.Code,
§ 5131), whether they entered into an
"agreement" for support within the meaning of that section, and whether husband
should be estopped, as wife claims, from
denying that his payments were in discharge of his duty to support.6 All of these
are issues for the trier of fact, not matters
which can be resolved by an appellate court.
We therefore perceive no alternative to remanding this case to the superior court for
additional findings.7
3.

Upon remand of this case the trial
court should take into account the
capital gains tax, if any, incurred by
the parties as a result of the sale of
the family residence.
The trial court ordered the family residence sold and the 'proceeds divided between the parties, less the reimbursement
to husband discussed in part 2 of this opinion, in such a manner as to equalize the
ment," although arguably such an agreement
might be inferred from the subsequent conduct
of the parties.
5. "There occur to us several considerations
pertinent to the determination whether a given
payment was in reality in discharge of the
paying spouse's duty to support. Where the
payment was made pursuant to a court order,
if the order specifies whether or not reimbursement is to be had, naturally the order will
control. The advisability of including such a
specification in every order for payment of
debts is obvious. Where the court order does
not specify whether or not reimbursement is to
be had or where the payment made was not
required by a court order, the determination
will be made on the basis of the relevant facts
and circumstances. However, two prime con-

division of the community property. Since
husband received personal property of substantially greater value than that awarded
wife, she will receive the larger share of the
proceeds from the sale of the house.
[7] The trial court's order does not mention the possibility that the parties might
incur state and federal capital gains tax
liability as a result of the sale of the residence. Noting that equalization of community property shares before taxes may result in her receiving less than half of the
net value of community property remaining
after payment of taxes, wife contends the
trial court erred by not expressly considering tax liability in its order. We agree with
wife that the court's division of community
property should take account of any taxes
actually paid as a result of the court-ordered sale of the residence, but explain that
this result can be achieved merely by construing the trial court's order, without need
to posit error by the court below.
In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17
Cal.3d 738, 131 Cal.Rptr. 873, 552 P.2d 1169,
we held that the trial court, in assigning to
husband the value of his interest in a law
partnership, need not take into account the
tax that might be incurred if husband at
some uncertain future date sold that interest. We there declared that "Regardless of
the certainty that tax liability will be incurred
. the trial court is not required to speculate on or consider .
tax consequences in the absence of proof
siderations will obviously be whether or not
there was a need for spousal or child support at
the time the payment was made and whether
or not the payment made was in addition to
reasonable support already being provided by
the paying spouse either pursuant to or in the
absence of a court order." (In re Marriage of
Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at p. 748, 145
Cal.Rptr. at p. 216.)
6. Wife contends that she relied on husband's
payments on the family home and consequently
did not seek a court order for support.
7. We leave to the discretion of the trial court
whether to reopen the proceedings for additional evidence or to render findings on the existing
record.
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that a taxable event has occurred during
the marriage or will occur in connection
with the division of the community property.11 (17 Cal.3d at p. 749, fn. 5, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at pp. 879-880, fn. 5, 552 P.2d at pp.
1175-1176 fn. 5; see Weinberg v. Weinberg,
supra, 67 Cal.2d 557, 566, 63 Cal.Rptr. 13,
432 P.2d 709.) (Emphasis added.)
Unlike Fonstein, which involved a speculative future tax liability arising on the
hypothetical sale of an asset, in the present
case the taxable event, the sale of the residence, occurs as a result of the enforcement
of the court's order dividing the community
property. In this respect the case at bar
resembles In re Marriage of Brigden (1978)
80 Cal.App.3d 380, 145 Cal.Rptr. 716, and In
re Marriage of Clark (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d
417, 145 Cal.Rptr. 602. In both cases the
trial court awarded husband community
property corporate stock, but ordered him
to give wife a promissory note to equalize
the division of community property; in fixing the value of the note, however, both
trial courts failed to consider that state and
federal taxing authorities would treat the
property division as a sale of wife's interest
in the stock and impose a capital gains tax
on the proceeds of the note. On these facts
the Court of Appeal in Brigden and Clark
ordered the trial court to revise its award to
take into account the wife's tax liability.
When husband in Clark argued that Fonstein precluded consideration of the capital
gains tax because the amount of the tax
could not be immediately determined,8 the
Court of Appeal rejected his contention and
directed that "[i]n order to equalize division
of the community property, [husband]
&. The Internal Revenue Code treats the award
or* the stock to husband, offset by a promissory
note from him to wife, as the sale of wife's half
interest in the stock, a sale which is subject to
capital gains tax. Because husband undertook
to pay the note in installments, the tax is
spread over the years in which wife received
the payments, and thus the amount of the tax
turned in part on her taxable income in such
years. (See discussion in In re Marriage of
Clark, supra, 80 Cai.App.3d 417, 422 and fn. 3,
145 Cal.Rptr. 602.)
9. Amendments enacted subsequent to the trial
of this case extended the period for reinvestment of the proceeds to 18 months.

should pay one-half of the capital gains tax
caused by the transaction." (80 Cal.App.3d
at p. 424, 145 Cal.Rptr. at p. 607.)
[8] In cases such as the instant matter
involving the sale of a family residence, the
uncertainty concerning the amount of capital gains tax liability stems from provisions
in state and federal tax law which defer
liability to the extent that the proceeds
from the sale are reinvested in a new residence within one year of the sale. (Rev. &
Tax.Code,
§
18091;
Int.Rev.Code,
§ 1034(a).)9 That uncertainty, however,
will be resolved within a year or two of the
court's decree.10 In the present case, the
amount of the tax liability may have been
fixed by events pending the decision of this
appeal, so the trial court, upon the remand
of this case made necessary by our holding
on the husband's right of reimbursement,
can recognize that liability in dividing the
proceeds of the sale. If not, and in similar
cases arising in the future, the court can
take account of tax liability by providing
that the liability incurred, if any, is owed
equally by both spouses. In unusual cases,
it could retain jurisdiction to supervise the
payment of taxes and adjust the division of
the community property. (See In re Marriage of Clark, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 417,
424, 145 Cal.Rptr. 602.)
[9] The trial court's order states simply
that, following reimbursement to husband,
"the balance of said sale proceeds shall be
divided between the parties in a fashion
which will equalize the division of the parties' community property." We do not
\D. If tne parties use the proceeds to purchase a
new residence, the resulting deferral of the capital gains tax reduces the basis of the new
residence. Depending upon future events, that
reduction in basis may result in a higher tax
when and if the new residence is sold. (Rev. &
Tax.Code, § 18095; Int.Rev.Code, § 1034(e).)
That possible future tax burden, however, is an
example of the speculative and uncertain tax
consea u ences which the trial court need not
consider under In re Marriage of Fonstein, supra, 17 Cal.3d 738, 749, 131 Cal.Rptr. 873, 552
P.2d H60.)
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think it necessary to interpret that order as
rejecting consideration of the tax consequences of the sale, and then to brand the
order so construed as erroneous. The judgment is susceptible of a construction consistent with the principles declared in this
opinion. (See 4 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d
ed. 1971) pp. 3209-3210.) We therefore
construe the judgment to provide that the
balance of the proceeds be divided so as to
equalize the division of the community
property after payment of any capital gains
tax incurred upon the sale of the residence,
and direct that the trial court, upon the
remand of this case, so apply the judgment.
4.

The community is entitled to reimbursement for community funds used
to pay husband's tax liability for his
separate income.11

In January of 1974 husband withdrew
$2,250 from a savings account at the Crocker Bank, conceded to contain only community funds, to make his quarterly estimated
income tax payment on his 1973 salary. All
of husband's income earned during 1973,
being postseparation, was his separate property. (Civ.Code, § 5118.) Hence the entire
tax obligation attributable to his 1973 earnings was his separate debt. Yet in dividing
the remaining community funds held in the
account the tr/al court deducted the $2,250
from the balance of the account on the date
of separation. Husband was therefore not
required to reimburse the community for
the use of funds to meet his separate property obligations.
[10,11] When a husband utilizes community funds to pay taxes relating to his
separate property income he must reimburse the community for such sums.
(Somps v. Somps (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 328,
338, 58 Cal.Rptr. 304; Estate of Turner
11. In parts 4, 5, and 6 of this opinion our
decision follows the opinion prepared by Judge
Sater for the Court of Appeal in this action
with only minor changes in wording.
12. We are aware of husband's contention that
the $2,250 withdrawn frOm the Crocker
account should be offset by the deposit of his
unused vacation paycheck into the Gibralter

(1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 576, 96 P.2d 363.) We
conclude that the trial court erred in failing
to charge husband's share of the community
property for the $2,250 withdrawn from the
Crocker Bank account 12
5.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion limiting spousal support to
$750 per month.

[12,13] "Although not unlimited, a + rial
court's discretion is broad in setting the
amount of spousal support to be awarded
upon dissolution of marriage." (In re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d 437, 454,
143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 150-151, 573 P.2d 41,
52-53.) Although a court may abuse its
discretion if it accords to one spouse a continued standard of living significantly higher than it accords to the other (see In re
Marriage of Andreen (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d
667, 671-672, 143 Cal.Rptr. 94), we cannot
agree with wife's contention that the trial
court here abused its discretion in failing to
provide her with support sufficient to maintain her past standard of living.
The record discloses that husband's net
income from his salary, after mandatory
deductions and medical and life insurance
premiums amounted to $2,471 a month; i.
e., $29,632 per year. In 1973 he netted an
additional $9,700 from his private practice
but $9,000 went to pay taxes that were due
because he was "under withheld" on his
salary. The trial court concluded husband's
overall net income amounted to $2,600 per
month.
He claimed expenses totaling
$1,750 per month, including $350 per month
to meet the cost of the parties' daughter's
college education. This left an available
income of $850 per month—a sum less than
the $950 awarded in combined spousal and
child support.
savings account. Approximately two-fifths or
$2,051 of this $5,000 check was husband's separate property. In dividing the funds in the
Gibralter account, however, the trial court apportioned only the $13,839.12 in the account at
the time of separation. Thus, the additional
balance in the account at the time of trial
remained husband's separate property.
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The trial court in the present case was
unable to provide fully for the anticipated
expenses of both parties. Husband's income is inadequate both to sustain two separate households at the standard of living
previously enjoyed by the parties and to
provide for the daughter's College education. We cannot say that the court abused
its discretion in fairly attempting to allocate the available income to meet the financial needs of both parties.13
6. The trial court abused its discretion in
terminating jurisdiction to modify
support as of April 15, 1981.
[14-16] The trial court ordered spousal
support to terminate on April 15, 1981,
without retaining jurisdiction to award further support after that date. The trial
court entered its order without the benefit
of our recent decision in In re Marriage of
Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d 437, 143 Cal.Rptr.
139, 573 P.2d 41. In Morrison we determined that: "A trial court should not terminate jurisdiction to extend a future support order after a lengthy marriage, unless
the record clearly indicates that the supported spouse will be able to adequately
meet his or her financial needs at the time
selected for termination of jurisdiction. In
making its decision concerning the retention of jurisdiction, the court must rely only
on the evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
13. Wife maintains that husband currently has
an increased ability to pay spousal support due
to the availability of tax deductions for such
support, the termination of child support and
the reduction in his expenses because mortgage, tax and insurance payments on the family home will no longer be required Husband
in turn asserts we should evaluate wife's lack
of effort to become self-supporting during the
postseparation period We hold only that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion at the
time of judgment Both parties may in the
future present further evidence to the trial
court on a motion to modify spousal support
At such time the court should reconsider the
needs, circumstances and financial status ot
the parties
14. We cannot accept husband's contention that
an award of support beyond his mandatory
retirement date (July 1, 1984) would conflict
with the equal division of community property

It must not engage in speculation. If the
record does not contain evidence of the
supported spouse's ability to meet his or her
future needs, the court should not 'burn its
bridges' and fail to retain jurisdiction." (20
Cal.3d at p. 453, 143 Cal.Rptr. at p. 150, 573
P.2d at p. 52; In re Marriage of Stenquist
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 779, 789, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9,
582 P.2d 96.)14
The record in the instant case is devoid of
evidence justifying an inference that wife
would be self-supporting on or after April
15, 1981. At the time of trial she was 48
years old without any specific employment
opportunities available to her. Although
she had earned a Bachelor of Arts degree
and expressed a willingness to seek employment, she would need to undertake considerable training before she would be qualified to compete in the job market. Prior
to the marriage wife had held only brief
and intermittent unskilled positions.
On the basis of this record the trial court
could only speculate as to wife's ability to
meet her financial needs on April 15, 1981.
The trial court's decision to terminate jurisdiction should be deferred until the facts
demonstrate whether further support is
warranted. (In re Marriage of Stenquist,
supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 790, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9,
582 P2d 96.) We conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in divesting itself of jurisdiction to amend spousal support after April 15, 1981.15
requirement of Civil Code section 4800, subdivision (a) The tnal court's order terminates
spousal support almost three years prior to the
date of husband's retirement Moreover, even
if a future award of spousal support must come
from husband's half of the community property
there is no requirement excluding such property as a source of that support As the Court of
Appeal below noted, "in every case where one
spouse receives permanent spousal support
from the other spouse, the source is from the
separate property of the paying spouse, including
earnings or property which were
once the community property of both spouses "
Husband's financial position may be re-examined if necessary at the time of his retirement
in light of both parties' circumstances.
15. We hold only that the tnal court erred in
divesting itself of jurisdiction to award spousal
support after April 15, 1981. The portion of
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7. Conclusion.
The portion of the trial court order granting husband reimbursement for traceable
funds he has expended during the period of
the parties' separation to preserve and
maintain the family home is reversed, and
the cause is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. The portion of the trial court order terminating jurisdiction to award spousal support commencing April 15, 1981, is
reversed. The portion of the trial court
order dividing the community property is
reversed to the extent that it fails to provide for reimbursement to the community
for community funds used by husband to
pay his separate tax liability. Interpreting
the portion of the order directing sale of the
family residence and division of the proceeds to require an equal division of community property after payment of any capital gains tax liability incurred by reason of
the sale, we affirm that portion of the
order, but the trial court is directed on
remand of this cause to divide the community property to attain the aforementioned
equal division. In all other respects the
judgment is affirmed.
BIRD, C. J., and MOSK, CLARK, RICHARDSON, MANUAL and NEWMAN, JJ.,
concur.
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the award terminating spousal support as of
April 15, 1981, remains valid, but the trial court
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Doctor sued witnesses, who testified
against him in hearing before judicial commission of private medical society, on
ground that the testimony was negligently
given and was motivated by malice. The
Superior Court, San Bernardino County,
Don A. Turner, J , sustained demurrers on
ground that the alleged defamatory publications were absolutely privileged and
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court,
Newman, J , held that: (1) hearing before
the commission was not an "official proceeding authorized by law," within statute
providing that privileged communication is
one made in legislative or judicial proceeding or in any other official proceeding authorized by law, and (2) statute extending
qualified privilege to communications that
are intended to aid in evaluation of qualifications of a doctor, if communications are
addressed to hospital, hospital medical staff
and professional society, medical school,
professional licensing board, peer review
must retain jurisdiction to modify that award if
economic circumstances warrant.
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In re the MARRIAGE OF Andrew J.
BECK, Petitioner and Appellant,
and
Doris Beck, Respondent and Respondent
No. 80-286.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs Feb. 17, 1981.
Decided July 9, 1981.
Husband appealed from that portion of
a judgment of marriage dissolution of the
District Court, Third Judicial District, Powell County, Robert Boyd, J. P., as divided
the parties' property. The Supreme Court,
Shea, J., held that: (1) the trial court's
findings of the husband's net annual income
and the value of the marital estate were not
supported by the evidence; (2) where a
property distribution included a taxable
event precipitating a concrete and immediate tax liability, that tax liability had to be
considered by the court before entering its
final judgment; (3) in making its equitable
distribution, the trial court properly did not
set aside the husband's joint tenancy transfer to the wife of an undivided one-half
interest in ranch property.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Divorce <$=> 253(3)
In marriage dissolution proceeding, trial court's finding that husband would have
net annual income of $21,000 and that value
of marital estate was $760,000 were not
supported by the evidence.
2. Appeal and Error «=» 1010.1(1)
Findings and conclusions may not rely
solely on perceived lack of credibility, but
they must be supported by evidence.
3. Divorce <s=»252.3(5)
Where property distribution ordered by
court in marriage dissolution case included
taxable event precipitating concrete and
immediate tax liability, that tax liability
had to be considered by the court before
entering its final judgment.

4. Divorce <s=>286(8)
In marriage dissolution proceeding,
husband's joint tenancy transfer to wife of
undivided one-half interest in ranch was not
due to be set aside, with only $15,000 acquired by parties during their marriage
through sale of two bars being subject to
equitable distribution between parties, in
light of fact that both parties were in ill
health and not able to find gainful employment.

Leaphart Law Firm, Helena, for petitioner and appellant.
Daniels & Mizner, Deer Lodge, for respondent and respondent.
SHEA, Justice.
Andrew J. Beck appeals from that portion of a judgment of the Powell County
District Court dividing the parties' property
as a result of a marital dissolution. He
contends that the trial court's findings and
conclusions are not supported by the evidence, that the court failed to consider the
tax consequences of its property division,
and that the court should not have considered certain assets which the husband
brought into the marriage to be marital
property subject to division.
Although we rule that the trial court
could properly consider the assets v hich the
husband had brought into the marriage, we
nonetheless must vacate the judgment and
order a new hearing. The findings and
conclusions are not supported by the evidence. Further, the court should have considered the tax consequences of the property division.
Andrew J. Beck (husband) and Doris
Beck (wife) were married in 1966 in Elko,
Nevada. It was the third marriage for
each of them. Both had children from previous marriages, but no children were born
to them during this marriage.
At the time of their'marriage, the husband owned a substantial amount of ranch
property in Powell County, identified as the
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Gold Creek property, the Red Hills property, and the Larabie Ranch.
During the marriage, the husband granted the wife, by joint tenancy deed, an undivided one-half interest in the Larabie ranch
property. It is approximately 760 acres and
was appraised at $393,462.80. Most of the
land, has been leased to others. In 1980,
they received $14,000 in rental from the
land, but in 1981, the rental income increased to approximately $16,000 per year.
During the marriage, the husband sold
the Gold Hills property under two contracts
for deed, one to Don Beck, and the other to
Ronald Cunningham. Payment from both
land contracts is assigned to the First Security Bank of Deer Lodge and the Federal
Land Bank of Missoula. In this appeal, the
husband contends that neither party receives income from the contracts. The
wife, however, contends that the husband
will receive a significant amount of cash
from these two contracts under the property distribution ordered by the trial court.
Her claim is unsubstantiated.
The Red Hills property contains about
2,100 acres and is subject to a life estate in
Andrew A. Beck (the father of the petitioner-husband here). The fair market value of
this property has been appraised at $247,386.
The husband and wife acquired other
property during their marriage, in particular, two baijr that they later resold for
profit. These bars were purchased with the
husband's funds but were improved by the
wife's efforts before they were resold.
The only evidence regarding the value of
the property was introduced by the husband. The trial court adopted the wife's
proposed findings and conclusions almost in
toto. We consider here only the major findings covering the division of the property.
The only evidence of the property value
was introduced by the husband, as previously stated. He also introduced the only evidence of the debts of the parties. The
undisputed evidence was that the Larabie
ranch property had a value of $393,462.80,
and that the Red Hills property had a fair
market value of $247,386. The total estate
was valued at $740,573.95. The trial court

adopted the wife's proposed finding that
the total value of the estate is $760,000.
The husband introduced evidence that the
proceeds from the contract for sale of the
Gold Hills property were unavailable to either the husband or wife because they were
assigned to a bank. The husband's accountant testified that the contract payments
from the Don Beck contract were "completely assigned to the First Security Bank
in Deer Lodge and the Federal Land Bank
in Missoula." Under cross-examination, the
accountant testified that the First Security
Bank mortgage on the property had been
paid off, but that the bank was holding the
contract proceeds under an assignment until the parties' other unspecified indebtednesses to the bank were paid off. The
accountant also testified that the proceeds
from the Cunningham contract were also
assigned to these banks. This testimony
was uncontradicted. In fact, the only evidence introduced by the wife concerning
their income was that they received $14,000
per year from rentals on the Larabie place.
The undisputed evidence is that the parties have an indebtedness of approximately
$92,000. The husband introduced into evidence a cash-flow chart showing that the
annual income of the parties was $23,583,
including the income from the Larabie
property. This evidence was uncontradicted.
Adopting the wife's proposed findings,
the trial court awarded the wife the Larabie ranch (valued at $393,000) together with
the right to receive the rental income (now
$16,000 per year).
The court awarded the rest of the property to the husband—the Red Hills property
(valued at $247,386, but subject to a life
estate), and the Gold Hills property—being
sold to Don Beck and Ronald Cunningham
under contracts for deed. The trial court
also ordered the husband to pay all debts of
the parties, amounting to over $92,000.
The trial court based this order in part on a
finding that the husband would have an
annual income of $23,583 per year. The
court found his income to be sufficient to
support the husband and also for him to pay
all income taxes, mortgages, attorney fees,
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and miscellaneous indebtednesses of the
parties, amounting to over $92,000. The
uncontradicted evidence, however, is that
the husband's annual income is only $9,000
per year, and from this he must not only
support himself but pay approximately $92,000 in bills.
The error lies in the failure of the trial
court to recognize an error, pointed out in
the motion, for a new trial, that the $23,583
annual income figure for the husband was
based in part on $14,000 rental income of
the Larabie ranch property. The court,
however, not only awarded this ranch to the
wife, but also awarded her the rental income, thereby cutting the income available
to the husband to a little over $9,000 per
year. The uncontradicted evidence is that
the lease payments from the Larabie ranch
amount to the greatest portion of the total
income available for distribution to the parties. From this $9,000 annual income, the
husband must meet his own living expenses
plus pay off over $92,000 of the debts.
Following entry of judgment, the husband moved for a new trial on the grounds
that the findings and conclusions were unsupported by the evidence, and also because
in entering the decree, the court failed to
consider the tax consequences of the property division. The motion was initially noticed up for hearing, but a later minute
entry indicates that the hearing was vacated upon stipulation of the parties. Both
sides presented affidavits in support of
their position on the motion for a new trial.
In her counter-affidavit resisting the husband's motion for a new trial, the wife
attested that the trial court's property division left the husband several sources of
income which could furnish him with over
$25,000 annually. The wife's allegations
are, however, partially speculative in nature
and wholly unsupported by the evidence.
These alleged amounts of income are not
set forth in the record. The wife has pointed to absolutely no evidence in the record
either supporting the trial court's findings
nor refuting the husband's contentions that
the property division left him with only
$9,000 in yearly income.
The motion for a new trial was not again
noticed up for hearing, and the trial court

took no action on the motion. As a result,
under Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P., the motion
was deemed denied ten days after the wife
served her counter-affidavit. A timely notice of appeal was filed, and this appeal
followed.
[1] With no support in the record, the
wife baldly asserts that the husband will
have a gross annual income of $37,000, and
that he will have a net annual income of
$21,000. She bases this argument in part
on an unfounded premise that proceeds
from the Gold Hill contracts are subject to
mortgage payments to the Federal Land
Bank in the amount of only $16,000 annually. The record supports neither the gross
annual income of $37,000 nor the $16,000
annual mortgage payments.
[2] The only evidence supports a finding
that the husband would have an annual net
income of just over $9,000. Further the
only evidence supports a finding that the
value of the marital estate is $740,673.95
rather than the figure of $760,000 set by
the trial court at the suggestion of the wife.
The trial court could have arrived at these
findings or conclusions only if it disbelieved
portions of the husband's evidence, but if
the trial court did not believe this evidence,
it was not free to arbitrarily set figures not
supported by the evidentiary record. Findings and conclusions may not rely solely on
a perceived lack of credibility; rather, they
must be supported by evidence. See, In Re
Marriage of Lippert (1981), Mont., 627 P.2d
1206, 38 StRep. 625.
The conflict between the evidence and
the findings resulted from the trial court's
wholesale adoption of the wife's proposed
findings and conclusions. We recently disapproved of such a practice. See, Tomaskie
v. Tomaskie (1981), Mont, 625 P.2d 536, 539,
38 StRep. 416, 419, citing Canon 19, Canons
of Judicial Ethics, 144 Mont, at xxvi—xxvii.
See also, Louis Dreyfus & CIE v. Panama
Canal Co.y (5th Cir. 1962), 298 F.2d 733, 737;
and Roberts v. Ross (3rd Cir. 1965), 344 F.2d
747, 751-752, which persuasively set forth
reasons why the trial court should do its
own work when drafting final findings and
conclusions.
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[3] Because the findings are clearly erroneous (see Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.), we
must set them aside and vacate the judgment. There is another reason, however, to
vacate the judgment. As the result of the
property division ordered by the court, the
husband moved for a new trial based in
part on his claim that some harsh tax consequences would befall him and that the trial
court had failed to consider these tax consequences. While we need not detail the tax
consequences here, for we order a new
hearing in any event, we take this occasion
to hold that where a property distribution
ordered by a court includes a taxable event
precipitating a concrete and immediate tax
liability, such tax liability should be considered by the court before entering its
final judgment.

transfer to the wife of an undivided onehalf interest in the Larabie ranch must be
set aside." The only purpose of that transfer, he argues, was to benefit the widow if
the husband should die, and, because they
are now divorced, that purpose has been
mooted. He therefore asks that the onehalf interest be set aside and the Larabie
ranch be restored to him as the donor.
Section 40-4-202, MCA, specifically directs the court to equitably apportion between the parties property "belonging to
either or both, however and whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is in
the name of the husband or wife or both."
This statute refutes the husband's argument, and we need not say more. An uncontested fact is that the trial court found
both parties to be in ill health and not able
to find gainful employment. Dividing only
the $15,000 profit realized from the sale of
the bars is not our idea of an equitable
property division.
The judgment is vacated and this cause
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In Re Marriage of Gilbert (1981), Mont.,
628 P.2d 1088, 38 StRep. 743, we held that
a District Court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider theoretical tax
consequences when the court-ordered property distribution does not contemplate any
taxable event which triggers present tax
liability. But where a present tax liability
will be triggered by the court-ordered disDALY, HARRISON, WEBER and
tribution, the court must make allowance
for such tax impact. Other courts have SHEEHY, JJ., concur.
held that a property distribution must make
allowance for the tax impact incurred by a
husband on account of a court-ordered
transfer of an interest in real property to
the wife. See, e. g., Wahl v. Wahl (1968),
39 Wis.2d 510, 159 N.W.2d 651. See generally, Annot, Divorce or Separation: Consid- The ESTATE OF Douglas J. STANDING
eration of Tax Liability or Consequences in
BEAR, Deceased, by and through CorDetermining Alimony or Property Settlerine Billy, Personal Representative,
ment Provisions, 51 A.L.R.3d 461. We hold,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
therefore, that at a new hearing, the trial
v.
court must consider any concrete and immeGerald BELCOURT, Jean Belcourt, and
diate adverse tax impact that a division of
Leota M. Standing Bear, Defendants
marital property might have on the parties.
and Respondents.
[4] A final issue raised by the husband
No. 80-390.
is that only $15,000 acquired by the parties
during their marriage through the sale of
two bars is subject to equitable distribution
between the parties. He argues that he
owned the property before the marriage
and it should still be his upon the dissolution of the marriage. Therefore, he asks
this Court to rule that the joint tenancy
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